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The position of Czech public finances has been pronounced unsustainable by 
economists, whereas Czech politicians claim the opposite. Concise analysis is complicated by 
the purposeful use of data by both these camps, by the different methodologies used to collect 
the data, and, above all, by the fact that there is no precise benchmark for measuring 
sustainability. 
This paper endeavors to work through such complications. It attempts to shed light on 
the sustainability of Czech public finances, presenting Czech public finances in an 
international context using comparable, same-methodology-based data, as well as taking 
different approaches and angles from which the public sector can be viewed. The analysis 
suggests that economists’ concerns about the future development of Czech public finances are 
indeed legitimate. 
Keywords:  budget process, deficit bias, factor analysis, fiscal illusion, open-ended 
expenditures, public finances, sustainability index. 
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Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes 
1. Introduction 
The recent accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union (EU), along with the 
country’s prospective euro adoption, after which the Czech Republic will be obliged to 
comply with the requirements of the EU’s stability and growth pact (SGP), raises concerns 
among economists and politicians alike about the long-term sustainability of Czech public 
finances. 
An assessment of the situation is complicated by at least four factors. First, since 
politicians are much less concerned with public finance, they tend to derogate the arguments 
of economists. Even more, since politicians are accountable for sustainability, or lack thereof, 
they tend to use facts selectively, and independent analysis is difficult. 
Second, quite the opposite applies for economists who, ever concerned with public 
finances, and often with the keen assistance of sensation-searching journalists, sometimes 
fashion the direst statistical data. 
Third, analysis is complicated by use of different statistical methodologies. While 
European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 95) methodology is used in the 
European context, the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) and the Czech Ministry of Finance use 
the International Monetary Fund’s methodology for Government Financial Statistics (GFS). 
Furthermore, in 2003, the CSO published an exceptional revision of yearly national accounts, 
which further complicates judgments based on ratios of relevant variables to gross domestic 
product (GDP). Therefore, besides the usual rattle and hum surrounding the politicians contra 
economists debate, one has to also establish whether the data employed are based on Czech or 
European methodology.
3
                                                           
3 In order to avoid confusion, this study uses only data based on ESA95 methodology, taken 
predominantly from Statistical Annex of European Economy - Autumn 2004, published by the European 
Commission, unless otherwise indicated. Fourth, even if one had relevant, comparable data at hand, it is hard to judge the long-
term sustainability of public finances without knowledge of the composition of public 
expenditures, without knowing if the deficit is the result of short-term measures or long-term 
trends, or even of what amount of public debt is sustainable, for there is no such benchmark.
4
In order to make an initial assessment of Czech public finances, one needs only a 
handful of relevant economic aggregates, which are included in Table 1. 
Table 1. Czech General Government Main Aggregates 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Budget  deficit -2.3 -2.2 -3.2  -13.4  -3.1 -2.4 -5.0 -3.6 -3.7 -5.9 -6.8  -12.6  -4.8 -4.7 -4,3 
Consolidated 
gross debt  :  :  :  :  :  12.7 15.0 16.0 18.2 25.3 28.8 37.8 37.8 39.4 40,6 
Total expenditure  48.3 67.0 47.5 54.4 42.8 42.4 43.8 42.9 42.1 45.0 46.9 54.5 46.7 46.3 45,8 
Total  revenue  46.0 45.0 44.3 41.0 39.7 40.0 38.8 39.2 38.5 39.1 40.2 41.9 41.9 41.6 41,5 
Budget deficit (based on GFS 
methodology)  :  :  -0.3 -1.1 -1.4 -0.5 -2.9 -2.3 -0.5 -5.1 -3.9 -3.2  : 
Consolidated gross debt (based 
on GFS methodology)  :  :  12.4 12.2 12.2 13.5 15.5 17.5 18.4 21.7 24.0 25.9  : 
Note: In percent of GDP at market prices, based on ESA 95 (except for the bottom two rows). The 2004 values are 
preliminary, the 2005–06 values are predicted. 
While GFS-based data are generally more favorable in accounting Czech public 
finances, a rising tendency of deficit financing is apparent from the two rows expressing 
budget deficits. As a result, Czech public debt more than tripled (according to ESA95 
methodology) in the period between 1997 and 2004, a period for which reliable data are 
available. Despite that it does not reach levels experienced by, for example, Belgium 
(exceeding 100 percent of GDP throughout the 1990s), its dynamic might raise some 
concerns. 
In order to think about deficits (i.e., if they are the result of one-off measures 
connected with, for example, transition expenses, or if they are result of trend development), 
it is instructive to look at the medium-term averages expressed in Table 2. 
                                                           
4 See Balassone and Franco (2000) for a survey of concepts and definitions used for assessing fiscal 
sustainability, and for a discussion of their respective advantages and shortcomings. Table 2. Six-year Averages, 1995–2000 and 2001–2006 (in percent of GDP) 
Total expenditures  44.7  47.5 
Total revenues  39.5  41.0 
Note: Based on ESA95 methodology. 
The conclusion one would arrive at based on this table is that growing deficits are not 
likely to be the result of one-off expenses, rather, they seem to be the result of growing 
disparity between increasing expenditures of Czech government and rather stable revenues. 
On first appearance, Czech public finances seem to have a tendency toward deficit 
spending. Lawmakers have lately realized this and proposed a set of measures to redress this 
course.
5
Will the intended measures be able to solve the problem of mounting deficits? Is the 
sustainability of Czech public deficits really threatened? Is the development Czech specific, or 
is it a problem of transitional countries in general? How to measure the sustainability of 
public finances? What determines the behavior of deficits and debt levels in the European 
context? 
This work hopes to shed some light on those questions. It tries to evaluate Czech 
public finances in an international context based on comparable (i.e., same methodology) 
data, if available. As the accession process toward European Monetary Union (EMU) in 
original EU members during the 1990s may offer a mirror to the contemporary position of 
new EU members, I examine the fiscal behavior of the prior group during that period. 
The paper is structured as follows. In second part, I construct a so-called sustainability 
index of public finances for the Czech Republic as well as for old and new EU member 
countries. In the third part, I try to answer the question whether the change of the budget 
process envisioned in a government reform package will be able to redress Czech public 
finances and solve the widening deficit problem. The fourth part will try to answer the 
question whether past Czech fiscal development is given by country-specific or European-
wide factors and will attempt to draw conclusions for the future. The fifth part will look at the 
composition of the Czech government’s budget and draw conclusions based on an 
international comparison, while the sixth part concludes the paper. 
                                                           
5 Measures of reform package, which is popularly known as “Reform of public finances”, are described in 
government’s decision no.624/2003 from 23
rd June 2003 “About Fiscal Outlook for years 2003 through 2006, 
Concept of the Public Budget Reforms“. 2. Sustainability Index of Public Finances 
As von Hagen and Harden (1994) note, assessing sustainability is relatively easy, at 
least in theory. Imagine each period’s t government budget constraint in the form   
    G t t t t i t t M B B T + = Δ + Δ − −1       ( 1 )  
where   and   are government expenditures and revenues in the relevant time period,   
and   are the stocks of government debt and base money at the end of the period  , and   
is the current interest rate on the public debt. After deflating this expression by nominal GDP 
(1) becomes   
    
t G t T t B
t M t t i
t t t t b b d Δ = + −1 ρ        ( 2 )  
where   is the primary government deficit expressed as the ration of GDP,   is the debt to 
GDP ratio, and 
t d t b
t t t t y i ln Δ − − = π ρ  is the real interest rate corrected for real GDP growth. 
Expressing this equation for   future periods yields   
           ( 3 )  
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Here  k t, σ  is a  -periods-ahead discount factor, which can be used to calculate the 
present value of assets and liabilities in period 
k
k t +  for period  , and   denotes 
expectation of 
t k t tx + Ε
x in period   given the information available at period  .  k t + t
Thus, equation (3) expresses the expected present value of government debt in period 
 relative to GDP in that period as a sum of the current-debt-to-GDP ratio and sum of all 
discounted-deficits-to-GDP ratios between period t and 
n t +
n t + . The theoretical requirement for 
the sustainable position of public finances (or, in other words, in order for an intertemporal 
budget constraint to be satisfied) is that the left-hand side of equation (3) must be equal to or 
lower than zero as   grows in size.  n
However, the practical application of this formula is rather limited. Sustainability 
requires that government debt cannot grow faster than the growth-adjusted real interest rate on 
average, but it does not preclude periods of much higher growth of debt, as long as they are 
counterbalanced by periods of low debt accumulation. 
To translate expression (3) into a practically usable form, one may consider 
intertemporal government budget constraints for limited periods of time and add the condition that the present value of the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of this period should not exceed the 
current one. This implies that public policy during that period can be maintained without 
adjusting government spending or revenue collection. 
To assess the sustainability of Czech public finances, I calculate a measure of 
sustainability as the difference between the current debt ratio and the discounted debt ratio for 
a fixed period of time,  , using actual data instead of an expected debt ratio and using the ex 
post real interest rate. The measure of sustainability then becomes  
    
* n
( ) * * ,
* E
n t n t t t t t b b n S
+ + − = σ       ( 5 )  
where  * , n t t + σ  is the ex post discount factor calculated from actual interest rates, inflation rates, 
and real GDP growth rates.
6 The second part of the right-hand side in equation (5) expresses 
the present value of public debt to GDP ratio   periods ahead and therefore public policy 
can be said unsustainable whenever 
* n
( ) 0
* < n St . 
Note that equation (5) includes a trade-off between choosing a longer time horizon 
(
* n  large), which captures the long-term orientation of the concept, and choosing a shorter 
one (
* n  small), which allows one to measure sustainability changes over time. Therefore, for 
the period for which relevant and internationally comparable data are available (1996–2004 
and, based on estimated values, 2005–06),  6
* = n  is used. The development of the 
sustainability index over time for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as for selected 
EU15 countries, is given in Figure 1. 
                                                           
6 This expression can be further rearranged, using (3), as   
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The development of Czech public finances toward unsustainability, especially when 
compared with neighboring, EU15 member states, is thus evident. Czech public debt develops 
in a manner even worse than do those of recent SGP transgressors: France, Portugal, and 
Germany. 
To be fair, the measures envisioned in the governmental fiscal-reform commitment 
can, given full implementation, improve the development of the sustainability index. 
Assuming full implementation, the reform would indeed heel the development of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. Sad to say, even assuming full implementation – which is a lot to assume – what 
the reform package does not offer is a significant improvement of the sustainability index 
toward above-zero values. 
Table 3 compares the position of Czech public finances in an international context 
against a six-year sustainability index for the EU25 (excluding Luxembourg due to lack of 
comparable data). Table 3. Six-year Sustainability Index, 2000,  ( ) 6
*
2000 = n S  
Czech 
Republic Portugal Cyprus Poland  Malta Hungary Slovakia  Latvia  France Slovenia Greece Estonia
-20.7 -9.6  -8.6 -7.9 -7.2 -7.0  -6.1  -6.0 -5.2 -4.9 -4.7 -0.4 
Ireland Lithuania  Germany Finland  UK  Sweden Netherlands Austria Spain  Italy  Denmark Belgium
-0.4 -0.3  1.9  2.6  3.3  5.9  6.9  8.1 14.9 15.6 18.8 26.2 
As can be seen, Czech public finances fare poorly in comparison, and this should not 
be downplayed by the fact that Czech public debt is not as high as the debts of some of these 
countries. Calculating ordinary and Spearman’s correlation indices of presented sustainability 
index with the estimated debt-to-GDP ratio in 2006 (chosen because it is the “end” year used 
in the calculation of the sustainability index for 2000) does not reveal any relation between 
the debt-to-GDP ratio and sustainability index. 
Table 4. Correlation between  
2000 Sustainability Index and 2006 Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Standard correlation index  0.23 
Spearman’s rank correlation index  -0.06 
Note: The correlation for twenty-four EU members from Table 3. Critical value for rejection of 
hypothesis of independence is 0.41. 
Therefore, judgment based on the sustainability index affirms the concerns of many 
economists regarding the future development of deficits and public debt in the Czech 
Republic, with mandated reform set to solve only half (if that) of the problem. 
Czech fiscal reform according to my view based on two key elements. The first 
consists of reducing public expenditures (cuts in social spending or cuts in public wages, 
among others). This is in full accord with the conclusions presented, for example, in 
McDermott and Wescott (1996), that is, that successful fiscal consolidation should be based 
predominantly on expenditure cuts rather than on greater taxes. The same conclusion follows 
from the empirical appraisal of fiscal consolidations by the European Commission (2003). 
Fiscal consolidation is considered more likely to be successful if it is based on expenditure 
cuts rather than on tax increases, and the more credible it is the higher the probability that it 
will have so-called non-Keynesian effects.
7 Higher credibility can be achieved, for example, 
by notable cuts in public wage expenditures, which signals a government’s commitment to 
less public spending, even if it is connected with unpopular measures. 
                                                           
7 Standard Keynesian economic theory (i.e., the IS-LM model) holds economic downturn to be connected 
with decreased governmental spending. Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations refer to events when 
fiscal consolidation leads to increased economic activity. A second key element consists in revising the budget creation process rules, aiming 
toward better addressing problems often found in political-economy literature to be connected 
with decisions of public-funds allocation.
8 The evaluation of this change from the 
sustainability perspective is dealt with in the next section. 
3. Quality of the Budget Process in the Czech Republic 
The sustainability or unsustainability of national public finances is ultimately 
determined by the composition and size of annual budgets as well as by decisions on the way 
in which public funds are raised, whether through revenues or deficit financing, which are 
also part of the annual budget. Every budget reflects three important considerations. First, the 
overall size; in other words, the degree to which government is to be involved in the economic 
activity of the nation relative to the private sector; second, who will be the beneficiaries of 
public spending, and what programs shall be financed from public resources, and; third, how 
will the public resources be raised, who will bear the burden of financing the public budget, 
and when. 
Given that public-funds beneficiaries are typically distinct from those who bear the 
burden of financing government activities, budget creation can be seen as a process of conflict 
resolution. Corroborated by two basic facts of the human condition – scarcity and limited 
altruism – such a conflict of interests is inevitable. 
Effective use of public resources (i.e., efficient responses to the above budget 
considerations) is dictated by at least three conditions. The first efficiency condition requires 
that the social benefits of public expenditure should be equal to the social costs of raising the 
resources. The second condition requires that the current social costs and benefits of 
government spending should be properly weighted against associated future costs and 
benefits. And the third condition requires that current government spending, taxation, and 
borrowing is consistent with its intertemporal budget constraint; in other words, that it be 
sustainable. 
The political-economy literature often cites three factors which lead to the inefficient 
use of public resources:
9 fiscal illusion, which refers to the tendency of government to be 
                                                           
8 For a brief but enlightening discussion of the problems connected with decisions regarding the allocation 
of public funds (i.e., problems often found in the budget-creation process), see von Hagen and Harden (1995). 
9 It must be added that those problems refer only to the supply side of the public-goods market, i.e., to the 
politicians' side. I do not tackle here the question of inefficiency on the demand side, i.e., I do not consider such 
questions as why citizens vote for irresponsible politicians repeatedly. Therefore, the terms “fiscal illusion” and inappropriately involved in national economic activity – it can arise when those who decide 
which programs will be publicly provided do not fully weigh the social costs of the programs; 
deficit bias, which is caused by a disregarding of the interests of future taxpayers vis-à-vis 
present-day decisions, which can lead to the excessive deficit financing of public activities, 
and;  misuse of public funds, which stems from the principal-agent nature of the political 
process, and refers to the use of public resources by politicians-agents for private benefits 
given insufficient control by voters-principals. 
Therefore, the nature of budget creation influences the effective use of public funds, a 
necessary condition for the sustainability of public resources. In general, there are two 
solutions to the problems outlined. One being the establishment of limits that government 
would impose on expenditures, annual deficits, debt levels, or tax burdens, and the second 
being a proper institutional structure of the budget-creation process that would ensure that 
resulting budgets efficiently address the above-said considerations as efficiently as possible. 
To judge the quality of the budget process, it is helpful to divide the process into four 
stages: (i) draft proposal, (ii) legislative approval, (ii) implementation, and (iv) ex post 
evaluation. 
Appropriate institutional structure of the budget process can limit the problems 
outlined above and help ensure that the resulting budget will be as efficient as possible. At the 
cabinet level, fiscal illusion can be limited by an assignment of special rights to the finance 
minister, by a requirement to agree on overall budget parameters at the initial stage of budget 
creation, by a requirement that budget drafts submitted to parliament itemize all governmental 
loans to non-government entities and government guaranties, or by requiring spending 
ministers to propose offsetting measures whenever they require more public funds from the 
budget. 
Desired institutional structure at the parliamentary stage includes initial voting on the 
overall budget parameters along with a requirement that all subsequent amendments be 
offsetting (i.e., amendments that result in higher governmental expenditure must either 
specify which expenditures should be cut instead or how extra funds are to be raised). 
Concerning budget execution, the approved budget must be taken as inviolable by the 
spending ministries. In this respect, proper overseeing and control over public funds, usually 
by the finance ministry, limits imposed on spending ministries, limited transfer of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“deficit bias” are used in the sense of von Hagen and Harden (1992), not in the sense of Buchanan (1968), who 
uses the terms in reference to fiscal illusion and bias toward deficit on behalf of citizens, i.e., he refers to the 
demand side of the public-goods market. expenditures between budget chapters, limited carryover of unused funds into subsequent 
years or stringent rules for amending the budget during its execution might be helpful. 
Ex post budget evaluation should include strict and ex ante–specified penalties for 
non-compliance as well as ex ante–specified rules as to whether entities that overspend are to 
be held accountable for the amounts by which they exceed their budgets. 
A provision that should improve the budget process in general (especially the first two 
stages) is recourse to an overall numerical limit that a government specifies ex ante to be 
applicable over the medium term. Governmental expenditures, deficits, taxation, or public 
debt, either in a level or a rate-of-growth form, or in a nominal or real expression, could be 
subject to such a numerical constraint. The more binding this constraint is, the more 
conducive it can be to the sustainability of public finances. 
The governmental reform of public finances in the Czech Republic includes measures 
that envision the change of the institutional arrangement of the budget process and aim at 
bringing future budgets closer to the mentioned efficiency requirements. It touches upon 
several areas. First, it envisions the introduction of medium-term expenditure limits. Every 
budget law in the future should thus include limits on governmental expenditure in three 
subsequent years, limits to be followed during cabinet negotiations of the budget in those 
years, and to be mirrored in subsequent budget drafts submitted to parliament. A second 
change anticipates greater transparency of budget drafts through more emphasis on 
government loans to non-governmental entities and through dealing with governmental 
guarantees. The third change aims at greater transparency and ex post control of the budget 
through a requirement to publish yearly financial reports on all public-funds receivers. Lastly, 
new rules regarding the practice of carrying forward of unused funds to subsequent years are 
to be specified. 
Are the changes proposed conducive to the sustainability of Czech public finances? In 
order to answer this question, I construct two indexes of quality of budget process originally 
used by von Hagen and Harden (1992) based on a professional evaluation of budget process. 
It is important to specify that this evaluation is based on current practices, not simply on 
relevant legal norms.
10 High values of either of the index indicates that the budget process 
should in fact ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances, or should at least be 
helpful. 
                                                           
10 I used the very same methodology (i.e., the same questions about budget process) as von Hagen and 
Harden (1992) and the same method for evaluating the answers (for which I must again thank Karel Bakeš from 
Czech Ministry of Finance) to those questions. A high structural index signals the strong position of the finance minister relative to 
spending ministries during cabinet budget negotiations, parliamentary process with limited 
amending possibility and initial voting on overall budget size, limited flexibility of budget 
implementation, and strict ex post control of and the transparency of budget. 
A high constraint index signals the presence of a medium-term numerical rule on 
some budget parameter, along with its binding nature, and the strong commitment to it by all 
agents present in budget process. The values of the two parameters before and after the Czech 
public-finances reform,
11 along with values for selected European countries taken from the 
original study of von Hagen and Harden (1992), are included in Table 5. 
Table 5. Budget Process Indexes 
Czech Republic 




Belgium France Germany  Greece Denmark 
Structural  index  35.9 34.6  72.5 51.6 25.9 51.6 48.1 
Constraint  index  21.9 31.6  45.5 46.6 27.9 46.6 35.7 
 Ireland  Italy  Portugal  Spain  UK  Spain  Luxembourg
Structural  index  27.0 19.7  32.2 30.8 58.4 30.8 35.2 
Constraint  index  32.0 20.0  19.6 26.8 44.4 26.8 22.2 
Note: Values of indexes for the EU12 countries taken from von Hagen and Harden (1992). The EU12 
structural index average is 39.9, and the EU12 constraint index average is 31.6. 
As expected, changes induced by public-finance reform increased the constraint index 
through the introduction of medium-term expenditure limits, but other measures present an 
overall decrease in the structural index. 
The von Hagen and Harden study concludes that, based on empirical investigation, a 
higher value of the structural index leads to a lower debt and deficit level, which is not case 
with the constraint index. 
The experience of the Czech Republic with the preparation of its budget for 2004 
bears out this conclusion. Original expenditure limits set by Government’s decision (2003a) 
were eventually adjusted upward by CZK 33 billion by Government’s decision (2003b), and 
yet governmental expenditures in state budget for 2004 exceeded the original expenditure 
limits by more than CZK 15 billion (i.e., by 1.7 percent of the budget). 
Thus, considering whether procedural reform of budget process will help ensure the 
future sustainability of public finances, and aware that structural index plays an important role 
                                                           
11 All the measures touching the institutional arrangement of the budget process that are part of the Czech 
reform of public finances has been embodied into the amendment of law, effective since 2005, specifying budget 
process in the Czech Republic. in this respect, one has to conclude that the governmental changes will likely not deliver the 
intended results. 
Comparisons of the Czech budget process with those of other European countries’ 
offer little optimism. More specifically, the values of both indexes, irrespective of whether 
before or after reform, are below the average of the twelve European countries presented in 
Table 5. One may object to comparing contemporary Czech and decade-old data. But noting 
that, as regards euro adoption, the EU12 countries in 1992 were in a similar position as the 
Czech Republic is today makes this comparison more relevant than would be comparison with 
contemporary data. 
The recent experience of most EU countries with compliance with the SGP, when 
most were forced to adopt some form of national level expenditure ceiling (European 
Commission 2003), suggests that the budget process at 1992 was not sufficient to meet 
European fiscal rules. 
When one accepts the interpretation that the value of the structural index of the budget 
process in Czech Republic is insufficient to ensure long-term public-finance sustainability or 
compliance with European SGP rules, what are the main deficiencies and how can the budget 
process be improved? The structural index can be decomposed into the four items listed in 
Table 6 along with their evaluation for Czech Republic. 
Table 6. Decomposition of Structural Index for Czech Republic 
Percentage of maximum points attained 
by Czech Republic  Item 
Before reform  After reform 
Structure of negotiations within government  31.3   31.3  
Structure of parliamentary process  50.0   50.0  
Informativeness of the budget draft  75.0   75.0  
Flexibility of budget execution  24.7   19.2  
The decomposition suggests that the budget process can be improved mainly at the 
cabinet level. The low value of item 1 mirrors the fact that the finance minister of the Czech 
Republic does not have any special authority over the spending ministries as regards the 
preparation of the budget. This also reflects the relatively low control of the finance ministry 
over the execution of the budget and leads to the low value of item 4, both of which were 
further weakened with legislation permitting the carrying forward of unspent budget funds to 
subsequent years. 
Therefore, possible recommendations how to improve the quality of the budget 
process essentially duplicates the recommendations of Alesina and Perotti (1996), which state that increasing the authority of the finance ministry along with adopting so-called closed rules 
of budget creation (procedural rules which give the authority to set the budget agenda in 
cabinet stage to the finance minister and which limit the scope for amendments) might help 
ensure that resulting budgets will be as efficient as possible and will respect sustainability 
principles for public finances. Alesina and Perotti also recommend measures intended to 
improve the transparency of budget drafting, which, as is evident from Table 6, does not need 
to be improved significantly. 
4. Development of Czech Public Finances in the European Context 
This section considers whether the past development of Czech public finances was 
affected by country-specific or by European-wide factors and draws relevant conclusions for 
future development, particularly as regards the behavior of deficits and public debt when 
subject to SGP rules after euro adoption. 
To investigate whether the behavior of budget deficits in Europe is given by country 
specific or European wide factors, a factor analysis is used.
12 To illustrate this statistical 
procedure, consider the following model   
     t i t i t i t i u x x y , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , + + = β β       ( 6 )  
     t j t j t j t j u x x y , , 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , + + = β β       ( 7 )  
     ( ) 0 ; cov , , = t j t i u u  
where   is country i’s budget deficit in year  ;   and   are unobservable, underlying 
shock common to all investigated countries; the coefficients 
t i y , t t x , 1 t x , 2
β  are country-specific reaction 
coefficients to those two shocks; and   is country  ’s specific disturbance term.  t i u , i
If the behavior of deficits is given by country-specific shocks only,   and 
behavior of deficits in the different countries is uncorrelated. If the behavior of deficits is 
given by unobservable common shock, 
0 , 2 , 1 = = t t x x
0 , , = = t j t i u u  and differences are given by country-
specific  i β ’s and  j β ’s. 
Factor analysis allows one to estimate the two underlying, unobservable common 
factors that determine the behavior of deficits, x, country-specific responses to those factors, 
β , correlation of deficits,  , with the unobservable common factors as well as the overall 
percentage of the variability of deficits caused by the underlying common factors. 
y
                                                           
12 For an introduction to factor analysis, see Härdle and Simar (2003). Figure 2 plots the correlation of deficits of the EU15 with the two most important 
common factors. Correlation with the first factor is on the horizontal axis, and the correlation 
with the second factor is on the vertical axis. Available data are from 1990 through 2004, and 
have been divided in the in year 1999, which represents the first year after the decision was 
made on which countries were eligible to enter the EMU. Because the correlation ranges from 
-1 to +1, the position of a country on the unity circle suggests that the behavior of the deficit 
in a given country is fully explained by the two unobservable factors common to all European 
countries.
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Figure 2. Results of Factor Analysis, EU15 
Note: Country abbreviations are as follows: Au - Austria, Be - Belgium, De - Denmark, Ge - Germany, Gr - Greece, Fi - 
Finland, Fr - France, It - Italy, Ir - Ireland, Lu - Luxembourg, Ne - Netherlands, Po - Portugal, Sp - Spain, Sw - Sweden, 
UK - United Kingdom. 
One conclusion that immediately follows from Figure 2 is that deficit behavior in 
European countries prior to euro adoption was predominantly determined by one underlying 
factor. Attractive interpretation is that this factor was perspective of not being eligible to 
adopt the common European currency. After fulfilling the requirement for eligibility, the EU 
members seem to spread out again, not perceiving the sanctions of the SGP as truly binding. 
Note the three groups of countries on the left picture. The first group consists of the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden: the countries that did not need comply with the fiscal rules 
required for euro adoption. The second group of countries consists (among others) of 
Belgium, Italy, and Greece: highly indebted countries which were required to cut their debts 
                                                           
13 In other words, if the behaviour of deficits through the given period in all countries was given by purely and budget deficits toward euro eligibility. Finally, the third group of countries consists 
(among others) of France, Austria, and Germany: those countries which had to cut their 
budgets deficits only prior to euro adoption. 
Because the present position of new the EU member states today can be seen as a 
mirror position of the old EU members more than a decade ago with respect to the euro 
adoption, consider Figure 3, which illustrates the correlation of deficits in new the EU 
member states for the 2000–2006 period with two underlying factors.
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Figure 3. Results of Factor Analysis, EU10 
 
Note: Country abbreviations are as follows: Cy - Cyprus, CZ - Czech Republic, Est - Estonia, Hu - Hungary, Ma 
- Malta, Lat - Latvia, Lith - Lithuania, Pl - Poland, SK - Slovakia, Slo - Slovenia. 
Two conclusions follow: First, the behavior deficits in the new EU member states is 
chiefly determined by country-specific developments, quite the opposite to that of the original 
EU member states. Second, despite that the present position of the new EU members vis-à-vis 
euro adoption is similar to that of the original EU members a decade ago, the new member 
states seem unaware of this. Their deficit behavior is not united by one underlying factor, as 
was the case of the original EU members. 
What does this imply for the sustainability of Czech public finances? If one accepts 
that the sustainability of public finances in general is given by the responsible behavior of 
politicians, the picture above can be seen to illustrate the fact that politicians in the new 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
country-specific factors, all the countries would be located in the middle of the unity circle. 
14 Data for years 2005 and 2006 were taken from convergence programs submitted by each country in 
order to extend the data sample and are hence estimates. member states have not yet realized that they should behave more responsibly toward EMU. 
In other words, they consider the European fiscal rules to be a matter of the future, not, 
unfortunately, of the present. 
The overall picture worsens if one applies factor analysis on both groups of countries 
simultaneously. Figure 4 addresses the question of whether the one-size-fits-all nature of 
European fiscal rules is, in fact, appropriate. 
Figure 4. Results of Factor Analysis, EU25 
 
Note: Country abbreviations are the same as for Figures 2 and 3, and data source for 2004 and 2005 are the same 
as for Figure 3. 
Note that deficit behavior of EU members is far from united; therefore, a common 
European monetary policy might not be appropriate. Policy will likely be determined or 
influenced mainly by EU countries that are located in the middle-left part of Figure 4. The 
immediate implication for Czech public finances is that it might not be appropriate since the 
behavior of budget deficits in the Czech Republic seems to be determined or influenced more 
by the second than the first unobservable common factor. Nevertheless, the Czech position is 
still a bit more perspective than the position of countries such as Slovakia or Slovenia, with 
their deficits behaving oppositely to the deficits of the main group of countries. 
Factor analysis can be taken further here. Having estimated the two underlying 
common factors, one can plug those into the regression model in order to estimate how 
sensitive the response of a budget deficit in a given country is when it is hit by one of those factors.
15 In other words, we can estimate the country-specific  i β ’s and  j β ’s from equations 
(6) and (7). 
If a country is hit simultaneously by the two underlying factors in the same direction, 
the deficit rises by the sum of the estimated regression coefficients. If, on the other hand, a 
country is hit by the two underlying factors in the opposite direction, then the deficit rises by 
the difference between the estimated regression estimates. Overall, the response of public 
finances to the underlying common factors can be important, especially once a country is 
expected to comply with SGP rules. For new EU member states, budget deficits are vital 
toward fulfilling Maastricht criteria for euro adoption. Table 7 includes the sums and 
differences of the two regression estimates for new EU member states, expressed as the 
percentage of the highest value. 
Table 7. Response of Budget Deficit Affected by Underlying Common Factors 
Factor direction  Cyprus  Czech 
Republic  Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta  Poland  Slovenia Slovakia
Same    21 20 15 34  4  3  19 44 17  100 
Opposite    38 100 35  15  14  5  77  10  3  19 
Sum  59 120 50  49  18  8  96  54  20 119 
Note: The sum/difference of each country’s regression estimates as a percentage of the highest sum/difference, based 
on data for 2000–2006, regression estimates respond to the factor analysis underlying the picture for new EU member 
states presented above. 
Because the factor analysis does not consider whether the two common factors are 
more likely to be in the same or opposite direction, probably the most revealing facet of Table 
7 is the last row, which illustrates that Czech budget deficits are much more volatile (along 
with deficits in Slovakia) than the deficits of other countries in the sample. 
To summarize, I tried to show that the behavior of deficits in the new EU member 
states is more country specific than the behavior of deficits in the original EU member states 
ahead of EMU. This can be interpreted as that the governments of the new EU member states 
still do not perceive common European fiscal rules as constituting an effective threat. 
From the perspective of future development, two things stand to threaten Czech public 
finances. The high volatility of deficits in the Czech Republic should be at least alarming, 
especially considering that the behavior of Czech deficits is determined by different factors 
                                                           
15 I add for interested readers that 
2 R  of such a regression model (with intercept) is equal to the distance 
of a given country on above pictures from the origin and the estimates of regression coefficients are equal to the 
first two eigen vectors of the correlation matrix of the original data. that determine the behavior of deficits in the main group of European countries that will 
probably influence most common monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
5. Composition of the Budget 
The composition of the budget can reveal something about the sustainability of public 
finances. More specifically, if the larger share of public expenditures consist of items that are 
not under the direct control of policy-makers, the budget document subsequently becomes a 
mere list of expenditures and of possible ways how to raise the funds needed to finance them. 
Its fulfillment than becomes a function of the quality of the predictions of the general 
economic conditions on which it is based. 
From this perspective, state expenditures can be divided into those under the direct 
control of policy-makers and those which are more or less outside their control, to which the 
economic literature usually refers to open-ended expenditures. Open-endedness refers to the 
fact that the exact amount of public funds needed to finance an expenditure is unknown at the 
time the commitment is made. 
Three types of government expenditures are usually mentioned in this context: (i) 
social transfers and social-welfare benefits, expenditures that are usually dependent on the 
economic cycle and are hard to predict during volatile periods; (ii) government interest 
payments on public debt, since those payments are given by monetary conditions, and by the 
composition of government debt and its maturity structure, which cannot be directly 
influenced by the government; and (iii) the public wage bill, since governments often find it 
hard to defy pressures for its increases. 
While the open-endedness of the first two types is usually given by the fact that they 
are prescribed by law and by the necessity to meet interest payments, open-endedness of the 
public wage bill is given by fact that policy-makers usually choose to treat this type of 
expenditure in such a way. Therefore, open-endedness is more political than economic 
category. 
From the perspective of public-finance sustainability, a high share of open-ended 
expenditures should be positively correlated with high public debt and/or higher deficits, since 
the development of both is given more by autonomous trends than by the decisions of 
politicians. This autonomous trend usually shows through snowballing effects working 
through the three channels. First, generous social transfers and social-welfare programs imply 
a high share of beneficiaries, which in turn implies stronger public pressure for greater generosity. Second, a high level of public debt implies high interest payments, which 
compounds deficits. Third, a high public wage bill usually stems from the fact that there are 
excessive public workers, which often extends to their stronger collective pressure for wage 
increases. 
Table 8 depicts the share of open-ended expenditure as a percentage either of GDP or 
of government expenditure. Because the methodology used by the European Commission 
differs from the methodology used by the OEC), the table depicts data computed from both 
sources. 















































































































Percent of GDP, 
European Commission data, 2004  20   20   21   21   21   22   25   25   26   26   30  
Percent of general government 
expenditure, 
European Commission data, 2004 
52   59   47   58   59   63   56   65   63   57   68  
Percent of GDP, 
OECD data, 2001  :  20   28   :  :  :  27   28   24   33   38  
Percent of general government 
expenditure, 
OECD data, 2000 





















































































Percent of GDP, 
European Commission data, 2004  31   31   31   33   33   33   34   35   36   37   38  
Percent of general government 
expenditure, 
European Commission data, 2004 
69   65   66   74   68   72   77   68   81   67   73  
Percent of GDP, 
OECD data, 2001  11   :  38   33   34   40   36   40   34   39   40  
Percent of general government 
expenditure, 
OECD data, 2000 
:  :  73   72   70   80   77   76   73   69   73  
Note: Open-ended expenditure is the sum of the public-employee wage bill, social transfers other than in kind, and 
interest payments on government debt. The countries in the table are ranked by the first row (European Commission 
data). 
Based on the table, Czech public finances do not seem to be directly threatened by 
their high share of open-ended expenditures. Based on European Commission data, the Czech 
Republic has the third-lowest share of open-ended expenditure, expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, in the data sample. But three comments need to be made. First, countries in the data sample are mostly from the original EU members, countries 
with much higher per capita GDP; in other words, countries that, in general, can afford to 
have generous welfare systems or to generously reward public employees. 
Second, the Czech Republic is the only of the new EU member states that has not 
reformed its pay-as-you-go pension system, despite many recommendations otherwise, 
including from the European Commission (2004a). Therefore, as Bezděk, Dybczak, and 
Krejdl (2003) note, the impact of future demographic changes on Czech public finances is 
expected to be considerable, and every postponement of a decision concerning Czech pension 
reform worsens the situation. (This threat is grave since the expected worsening of Czech 
public finances stemming from population ageing is likely to be incremental, which implies 
that future policy makers might be reluctant to introduce difficult reforms). 
Third, a high level of public expenditure is often needed in transition countries since 
they need to invest more than developed countries into infrastructure and related projects. 
This need is likely to prevail in the near future and will put Czech public finances under great 
pressure. 
Thus, based on the share of open-ended expenditure expressed as a share of GDP in 
the composition of the general government budget, the position of Czech public finances is 
not the worst, but it is not encouraging. 
6. Conclusion 
As noted at the outset, measuring the sustainability of public finances is not an easy 
task. A basic problem, besides the use of different methodologies, is that there is neither a 
generally accepted definition of sustainability nor a benchmark for comparative purposes. 
Therefore, I tried to put down some arguments about Czech public finances based on 
comparable data where available and in the widest international context possible. 
Previous analysis revealed four facts. First, based on the sustainability index, Czech 
public finances deteriorated recently at a faster pace than the public finances of other EU 
member states, and, further, measures envisioned in Czech fiscal reform, even when fully 
implemented, are not likely to considerably improve this situation. 
Second, although the quality of the budget process in the Czech Republic is not 
exceptionally poor, it is not likely to ensure the fulfillment of European fiscal rules, and 
recently proposed institutional changes, while well intentioned, will not alter this course. Third, the behavior of deficits in the European context seems to be generally 
determined by two underlying common factors. The behavior of deficits in the old EU 
member states is, from this perspective, more uniform than those in the new EU member 
states. This suggests that policy-makers in the latter group of countries do not treat European 
fiscal rules as binding. Furthermore, the monetary policy of the ECB, if determined by the 
needs of the majority of its members, might not be appropriate for the Czech Republic. 
Besides this, deficits in the Czech Republic seem to respond more sensitively to the estimated 
underlying common factors than do deficits in other new EU member states. 
Fourth, looking at the sustainability of Czech public finances as regards the 
composition of the general government budget gives a somewhat more positive picture, 
which, however, worsens when considering that the Czech Republic is the only country 
among the new EU members that has not yet reformed its pension system and which is thus 
more exposed to future demographic changes. 
Based on those four facts, I suspect that rising or unreasonably high deficits will be the 
main problem of future Czech governments and could well complicate the country’s adoption 
of the common European currency. Given that one of the most cited critiques of the SGP is its 
lack of enforcement, a situation could arise in which first fiscally misbehaving new EU 
member will punished exceptionally harshly by the European Commission as a means to send 
a clear signal that European fiscal rules are to be heeded. In other words, the first 
transgressing new EU member state is likely to make an example of. I hope it is not to be the 
case of Czech Republic. 
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